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I. SUMMARY 
 
In assessing the state of press freedom in Indonesia, the key-
word to look up is insult.  It is listed as a crime in a special Title of 
the Criminal Code the country inherited from its colonial past.  The 
word insult, or belediging in the original Dutch language is often 
referred to in the Indonesian language as fitnah, an Arabic word.  
In the Arabic lexicon, the word fitnah is linked to at least two 
                                                                                                             
* Of Counsel, Makarim & Taira S. Law Firm.   
This essay is an updated version of a paper presented to the Law 
Colloquium 2004: From Insult to Slander, Defamation and Freedom of the 
Press, Jakarta, July 28-29, 2004. 
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references in the Holy Qur’an which define it as more cruel than 
murder.  Secular laws and religious condemnation lend legitimacy 
to judicial intransigence to appeals for the removal of excessively 
severe laws against insult.  Prosecution, the judiciary, and the 
majority of the Indonesian polity demand that the criminalization 
of insult be maintained.  Those on the other side of social critique, 
which include all three branches of the state, want even harsher 
punishments, stiffer fines, and larger damage awards.  It is civil 
society in the French meaning of the term, that is, the collectivity 
of persons with individual liberty who objects to jailing critics.  
Civil society in transitional democracies, constitutes a tiny minority 
in urgent need of organization.  
The civil suit against insult is begun by lodging a complaint 
with the court.  Civil Code Article 1372 allows the plaintiff to 
claim real and verifiable damages, and damages for the restoration 
of honor and good name.  In addition, a defendant may also be 
compelled to make public apologies.  The article directly links the 
civil code with the criminal code’s special Title XVI on Insult and 
its 12 articles.  The provisions under this title, articles 310-322, set 
the size of fines and the terms of imprisonment.  The filing of a 
civil suit does not bar the public prosecutor from commencing 
criminal proceedings against the defendant in the civil case if the 
plaintiff had him reported to the police.  The insulter may, 
therefore, expect a series of punishments consisting of pecuniary 
compensation for real damage, awards for restorative damages, 
public apologies, criminal fines, and jail terms.  Insult is a serious 
matter. 
In order to come within the scope of insult as defined in the 
Criminal Code an accuser must deliberately direct an accusation of 
certain facts to the person of the accusee.  The civil suit will not be 
admitted, and the accuser will escape criminal punishment, if he 
has clearly acted in the public interest.  The truth of the accusation 
is of no importance, unless the accusation was motivated by a 
public interest concern, in which case the judge may allow the 
accuser to prove the truth of his accusation.  These statutory rules 
have not been consistently applied by the courts.  In one case, an 
editor wrote an angry piece sharply criticizing the installation of an 
official as member of a city council notwithstanding the council’s 
knowledge of the candidate’s involvement in two customs 
proceedings.  Public interest motive was clearly proven, and truth 
of the allegation was established.  The editor was sent to jail 
anyway.  On the other hand, failure to prove the truth of 
accusations in other cases got the publications exonerated for 
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reasons that they tried to cover both sides, and offered to respect 
the insultees’ right of response.  Not much guidance in terms of 
predictability of the law here.  The fact remains that a regime of 
laws hostile to criticism, particularly when directed at government, 
are retained in the old codes and the new statutes. 
Among the restrictive provisions, three sets of laws stand out 
as particularly hostile: the so-called hate-sowing articles 154-157, 
the “major” lѐse majesté articles 134-137 of the Code regarding 
insults directed at the president or the vice president, and the 
“lesser” lѐse majesté articles 207 and 208 on insults to government 
authorities.  While the concordance principle had Indonesia take 
over the Dutch codes lock, stock, and barrel, most of these 
oppressive provisions are not to be found in the codes of the 
Netherlands.  They were tailor-made for the colony.  
The hate-sowing articles made public expressions of feelings of 
hatred, hostility, and contempt against established authority 
punishable by imprisonment for up to seven years.  These were 
formal offences.  The mere expression of those feelings is 
sufficient for the prosecution to move in with indictments.  These 
articles were recently challenged in the Constitutional Court and 
found to be in violation of fundamental rights guaranteed in the 
Indonesian Constitution.  The sound decision was a bit marred by 
dicta expressing the Court’s relief that a new draft Penal Code 
includes the very same provisions, this time as material offences. 
Articles 134-137 of the Criminal Code were successfully 
challenged as well.  The articles protecting the president and vice 
president from insults were found by the Constitutional Court to be 
in contravention of the basic principle of equality before the law.  
The provisions were declared unconstitutional and having no force 
of effect, but then the Court proceeded to split both the president 
and the vice president in two parts: The part of the individual 
person has, like everybody else, recourse to Criminal Code articles 
310 et seq when insulted.  The presidential and vice presidential 
person parts, however, were to remain protected by articles 207 
and 208, the “lesser” lѐse majesté provisions in the code.   
The principle of equality before the law was maintained by 
pronouncing the government dignitaries subject to laws applicable 
to everybody else, but promptly set aside this action by placing 
them under the protective regulations for government authorities.   
The issue with Criminal Code articles 207 and 208 is more 
serious than was thought when the articles were simply thrown in 
the grab bag of complaints filed with the Constitutional Court.  Not 
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only were they thought unfit to be placed in the codes of civilized 
European nations and, therefore, absent from the Dutch Criminal 
Code, they were also deliberately made to make it easier to 
prosecute offences which are not punishable under Dutch law.  
Criminal Code Article 207 withholds from offenders their right to 
the defense of public interest, and removed the judicial discretion 
to order offenders to prove the truth of their allegations.  The 
article which was specifically enacted for governing a subjugated 
nation, conflicts with section 2 of article 312, a systemic part of 
Title XVI, Book 2 of the Criminal Code.  The section allows the 
offender to present proof of his accusation against a government 
official in the performance of his duties.  Thus, a right granted by 
law to offenders is revoked by way of choosing which law to apply 
for one and the same offence.  This is a violation of serious 
proportions.   
So far Criminal Code Articles 207 and 208 have not been 
challenged in the Constitutional Court as a generically different set 
of laws from other, equally oppressive provisions in the Criminal 
Code.  The articles have usually been lumped together with others 
in the rush to request their collective repeal.  In its decision on the 
hate-sowing articles, the Court held the request for constitutional 
review of 207 and 208 inadmissible because of a procedural 
matter: the Court did not acknowledge petitioners’ legal standing 
regarding the articles.  In deciding the unconstitutionality of the 
lѐse majesté articles, however, the Court gave a clear indication 
that a request for constitutional review of Criminal Code Articles 
207 and 208 would not be favorably received.   
Judging from a number of decisions bearing on freedom of 
expression, it seems that the Indonesian Constitutional Court has 
decided to opt for the status quo rather than risk controversy.  It 
has consistently turned down opportunities to confirm change and 
lead to a future of accountable governance.  This avoidance of 
change was not because there are no Asian examples of how courts 
have adopted changes gracefully and responsibly.  The Korean 
Constitutional Court reasoned that too strict an implementation of 
the requirement to prove truth and public interest would stifle 
press freedom.  The Japanese Supreme Court cautioned against 
giving too much protection to the honor and good name of 
government officials, and promotes the free flow of information 
and opinion to enable the people to partake responsibly in political 
decision-making.  The Indonesian Constitutional Court chose to 
maintain colonial and post-independence laws, which are inimical 
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to freedom of expression.  This was done by way of expounding on 
a theory of requisite balances between rights and duties, between 
the exercise of freedom and its limitation by the freedom of others.  
Balances are conditions of rest.  In a context of rapid change, it 
conduces to abrupt changes, often violent, and always ill-prepared.    
Draconian laws applied, within circumstances sometimes 
described as systemic corruption, contribute to abuses of power, 
selective prosecution, and miscarriage of justice. Notwithstanding 
these serious obstacles to freedom of expression, Indonesia has 
been listed as having one of the freest presses in Southeast Asia.  
The Indonesian press is presently continuing its multilateral 
engagement of the public, the state, and the courts.  If the past is of 
any guidance, change may have to be seized through careful 
legislation and the ponderous processes in the conventional court 
hierarchy.   
 
II. INTRODUCTION 
 
In 1941, a year before the Japanese armies routed the Dutch 
military force in the then Netherlands East Indies, a middle-aged 
well to do Chinese businessman absconded with a 19 year old girl 
and carried on weeks of extra-marital activities with her.  The daily 
newspaper Keng Po took up the story in all its concupiscent 
details.1  The rich man appointed a top litigator and sued for libel.  
The defendant argued that the victim was only 19, while the 
perpetrator had a daughter who was already 17.  He also argued 
that the despicable act could be construed as concubinage, a 
practice forbidden by the Criminal Code, and yet fashionable 
among men of means of a specific ethnicity.  Keng Po was 
promoting a newly emerging ethical movement called New Life, 
and felt duty-bound to campaign against this disgraceful behavior.  
The write-up was done for the purpose of defending the public 
interest, the only excuse the Criminal Code allows to escape 
punishment. 
The court disagreed and held the newspaper liable for intrusion 
into the plaintiff’s private life, adding that the salacious language 
used in the coverage of the matter was improper.  Ethical 
movements must employ ethical words and phrases.  Damages in 
                                                                                                             
1. KENG PO, an Indonesian language daily newspaper in its editions of May 
20 and 24, and June 10, 1939. 
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the amount of f450 (four hundred fifty Dutch colonial guilders)2 
was awarded to the plaintiff.3  At no time did the plaintiff contest 
the facts stated in the newspaper coverage.  The truth was 
established, but truth is of little import and easily brushed aside as 
insignificant in torts involving defamation.  Proving the truth of an 
allegation is not a right defendants have under either the Civil 
Code or the Criminal Code.  It is a favor the judge may bestow 
only if the defendant alleges that it was public interest which 
moved him to publicize the allegedly libelous statements.  Judges 
are not obliged to order defendants to prove their allegations even 
if they were moved by considerations of public interest.  Even 
when public interest was accepted, and truth was established, the 
defendant will still be punished.4  To establish a valid cause of 
action it is sufficient for plaintiff to feel hurt by the allegation 
made against him, and that it has done harm to his good name and 
reputation. 
Armed with the victory in the colony’s capital, the enthused 
abductor proceeded to file a suit against a publication in the town 
of Semarang covering the same matter.  The Semarang court 
awarded damages in the amount of f500 but startled the legal 
fraternity when it held the writer, the editor and publisher liable as 
joint actors in the commission of the offence.5  The decision 
contravened consistently upheld rulings of the Dutch Supreme 
Court that ex-article 1372 Civil Code damages claims: 
(i) are only admitted against defendants who deliberately 
commit the offence,6 and that  
(ii) publishers can be held liable only if they have prior 
knowledge of the libelous content of writings appearing 
in their publications.7 
                                                                                                             
2. When asked what f450 would be in today’s currency, octogenarians 
interviewed recalled that it would probably buy three Raleigh 3-speed bicycles. 
3. Raad van Justitie, Batavia First Chamber, August 22, 1941, Tijdschrift 
van het Recht (“T”) 154, at 730-731. 
4. See infra page 15 and note 36. 
5. The Matahari case was referenced in the case report on the Batavia Raad 
van Justitie (the Court of First Instance for Europeans and those who had 
submitted themselves to the Civil Code by, in this case for instance, by claiming 
a cause of action pursuant to Article 1372 of the code) decision, id. at 734.  No 
separate report on the case is available. 
6. Hoge Raad, December 19, 1913, N.J. 1914, at 305 (as cited by the author 
of the end-note to the Batavia court decision, writing under the initials of “v. 
H.”). 
7. Hoge Raad, April 9, 1926, N.J. 1926, at 525 (cited by the same author of 
the above-cited end-note.).   
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The precedents regarding this matter should by no means be 
interpreted as barring damage suits against publishers in an 
increasingly complex management structure of modern 
newspapers.  A negligent publisher can always be held accountable 
for libel damages, but the suit ought to be brought on the basis of 
his status as employer of the editor.  The suit may be filed pursuant 
to Article 1367 of the Civil Code which provides that employers 
may be held liable for torts committed by their employees.8  
Deciding on the choice between an Article 1367 cause of action 
and a suit pursuant to Article 1372 has pecuniary consequences.  
Courts insist that the measure of damages claimed under the tort 
articles proper9 must be strictly confined to real and quantifiable 
damage incurred.  The fat prize is given to claims under Article 
1372 which provides for both quantifiable and immaterial 
damages.10 
 
III. STRETCHING TORTS AND DAMAGES 
 
Mr. Cohen lived in Amsterdam.  He was in the printing 
business.  Sometime, in the early twentieth century, he managed to 
persuade an employee of Mr. Lindenbaum, his business 
competitor, to divulge company secrets in exchange for certain 
promises.  For an extended period of time Mr. Cohen became the 
                                                                                                             
Dutch Supreme Court precedents may be applied to similar cases in 
Indonesia pursuant to the so-called concordance principle.  See Sections (1) and 
(2) of Article 159 of the Law on the Governance of the State of the Netherlands 
East Indies (Law of September 2, 1854, State Gazette of the Netherlands: 
S.1854-2, State Gazette of the Netherlands Indies: S. 1855-2 jo 1).   
Note also that almost all of the articles of the Indonesian Civil Code, 
Commercial Code, Criminal Code, and Civil Procedural Code have their Dutch 
code counterpart article numbers printed on the side of each page.  Indonesian 
law codes are basically old Dutch codes. 
8. See “v. H.” end notes to the Batavia court report in T.154, at 735-737; “v. 
H.” is thought to be the initials of the very prominent Criminal Law scholar 
Professor W.F.C. van Hattum, co-author with Professor J.M. van Bemmelen of 
one of the leading texts on Criminal Law, the 2-volume HAND- EN LEERBOEK 
VAN HET NEDERLANDSE STRAFRECHT. 
9. INDONESIAN CIV. CODE 1365-1371. 
10. INDONESIAN CIV. CODE 1372: 
The civil suit regarding insult aims at compensating the damage, and at 
curing the loss suffered in honor and good name. 
In the valuation thereof the judge shall pay attention to the degree of 
grossness of the insult, besides the condition, status and the wealth of 
the adversaries.  
(the unofficial translation from the Dutch original is the author’s). 
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recipient of lists of customers, the range of prices charged, and 
contents of letters marketing Lindenbaum’s products and services, 
all highly confidential information of the competitor’s business.  
Mr. Cohen’s business flourished, while Mr. Lindenbaum’s 
declined.  The cause of this unfortunate course of event was soon 
discovered, and Mr. Lindenbaum sued for damages under the civil 
code’s general tort article 1401.11  On 18 March 1918 the Court of 
Appeal in Amsterdam rejected Lindenbaum’s claim on the theory 
that Cohen did not commit any act which was prohibited under the 
law.12  The fault element, indispensible for the determination of a 
tort, was missing.  Lindenbaum appealed, and the Supreme Court 
gave him what he wanted, and in the process shocked the Dutch 
legal community.13  The core article for tort, literally an unlawful 
act, Indonesian Civil Code Article 1365, required the presence of 
the following elements: 
(i) the commission or omission of an act; 
(ii) the act is unlawful; hence the existence of a fault; 
(iii) the act has caused harm to another person or property 
owned by another; 
(iv) the harm is caused directly and immediately after the 
Act; 
The decision by the highest court in the Netherlands held that, 
in addition to the aforementioned ingredients, tort could also be 
established if the defendant’s action is: 
(v) in conflict with his obligation, or 
(vi) violates the principle of morality, or 
(vii) contravenes the duty of care, or propriety in social 
interaction towards other persons, or towards the 
property of others. 
The decision became a precedent in the Netherlands and, 
through the concordance principle,14 was faithfully followed by 
courts in Indonesia.  It was occasionally, either by mistake or 
                                                                                                             
11. The referenced article number is for the Dutch Civil Code (old); its 
Indonesian counterpart is INDONESIAN CIV. CODE 1365. 
12. The Cohen-Lindenbaum case, Hooggerechtshof (court of appeal) of 
Amsterdam, March 18, 1918, N.J. 1918, at 1094; see also A. PITLO, HET 
VERBINTENISSENRECHT NAAR HET NEDERLANDS BURGERLIJK WETBOEK 218-
219 (3rd print. 1952). 
13. The Cohen-Lindenbaum case, Hoge Raad, January 31, 1919, N.J. 1919, 
at 161; it was said that the aim and consequence of the decision was like the 
introduction of a new Book in the civil code.  See also H.F.A. VÖLLMAR, 
INLEIDING NEDERLANDS BURGERLIJK RECHT, N.V. 467 (Uitgevers-Maatschappij 
W.E.J. Tjeenk Willink, Zwolle, 1955). 
14. See supra note 6. 
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design, used by plaintiffs to expand the reach of the special tort of 
insult.  On May 24, 1999, one year after the fall of president 
Suharto, Time Magazine came out with an issue covering the 
financial exploits of a family who had been in power in Indonesia 
for over 32 years.15  The coverage used terms and phrases such as:  
(i) Suharto Inc.  
(ii) How Indonesia’s longtime boss built a family fortune; 
and  
(iii) A staggering sum of money linked to Indonesia had   
been shifted from a bank in Switzerland to another in 
Austria, now considered a safer haven for hush bank 
deposits.  
The family sued Time for libel.  The case was thrown out by 
both the court of first instance16 and the court of appeal.17  The 
Supreme Court, however, overruled the lower courts’ decisions 
and awarded damages in the staggering amount of Rp. 189 
trillion.18  In its decision, the panel of Justices19 adopted plaintiff’s 
argument that the lower courts failed to take sufficient note of 
plaintiff’s brief in their reasoning for rejecting the cause of action.  
Lawyers for the plaintiff filed their double-barreled claim by using 
the general tort article 1365 concurrently with the special tort 
article 1372 on insult.  Civil Code Article 1365 was resorted to for 
its expansive reach pursuant to the 1919 Dutch Supreme Court 
decision.20  Obviously, Article 1372 was employed not merely 
because it is the legally designated basis for defamation suits, but 
more importantly because it allows plaintiff to claim both 
quantifiable and verifiable damage, and whatever amount of 
money it takes to restore the good name and reputation of the 
victim.  Having taken advantage of the wide reach of torts pursuant 
to Cohen vs Lindenbaum, plaintiff proceeded to substitute the 
doctrine of objective criteria for the strict requirement under 
Criminal Code Article 310, to prove that the defendant had 
                                                                                                             
15. Major-General Suharto seized power in March 1966 and was forced to 
step down in 1998. 
16. Suharto v. Time Inc., Central Jakarta District Court, June 6, 2000, 
Decision No.338/PDT.G/1999/PN.JKT.PST. 
17. Suharto v. Time Inc., Jakarta High Court, March 16, 2001, Decision 
No.551/PDT/2000/PT.DKI. 
18. Suharto v. Time Inc., Supreme Court, August 30, 2007, Decision No. 
3215K/PDT/200.  The Rp.-US$ exchange rate at the time was approximately 
Rp.10.000,- to the US$. 
19. The panel consisted of a military judge, acting as chairman of the panel, 
and two religious court judges. 
20. See supra note 11. 
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committed the defamatory act deliberately.  The doctrine 
originated in the cause-and-effect theory of the general tort.  It was 
alleged that the modern theory of objective criteria has superseded 
the ancient dolus and animus injuriandi concepts of the Criminal 
Code.  The objective criteria theory would have the actor liable if 
he was aware that the impact of his deed would result in a specific 
effect on the victim.  In the heat of an international campaign 
against corruption, it wasn’t easy to assess the specific effects of an 
investigative report on a fallen leader who had been ill for some 
time.21  Domestic and international coverage of the accumulated 
wealth of Suharto’s family prior to Time’s May 1999 issue had 
been widespread and intensive with no noticeable reaction from 
either Suharto himself or his family.22  
The Supreme Court almost paraphrased plaintiff’s brief, 
overruled the lower courts’ decisions, took over the matter, and 
awarded damages in the exact amount demanded by plaintiff.  
Upon judicial review a different panel of judges of the same court 
overruled the decision, and affirmed the lower courts’ decisions.  
The court held that Time fulfilled norms governing the activities of 
                                                                                                             
21. Suharto has been in ill health before his forced retirement.  
BBCIndonesia.com reported on May 19, 2006 that the fallen leader has had 
intensive testing done during a 3-day stay (July 9-11, 1996) at the Heart Center 
in Bad Oeyenhausen, Germany; he suffered a light stroke on July 20, 1999 and 
was rushed to the hospital, and since then had been in and out of hospital for 
bleeding intestines, appendicitis operations, pace-maker implant, lung infection, 
difficulty in breathing, and high fevers.  In August 2002 the Indonesian Supreme 
Court ordered the suspension of court proceedings against Suharto pending an 
examination on his condition of frequent lapses of memory, emotional flare-ups 
due to irritation caused by incapacity to express thoughts in words, and speaking 
difficulty reducing communication to 4 words at a time.  See on the late 
president, IndonesiaNow BlogSpot, available at 
http://theindonesianowulasan.blogspot.com/2008/01/jejak-soeharto-di-rumah-
sakit.html (last visited July 10, 2010). 
22. Note that the Time publication at issue was the investigative report 
appearing in its Volume 153, No. 20, of May 24, 1999.  That was preceded by 
the daily MERDEKA on September 15, 1998 likening Suharto to the Pharaoh 
depicted in religious texts as the epitome of evil and sinfulness; the daily 
KOMPAS on November 17, 1998 carrying a report that the assembly of all 
university rectors in the country demanded the tracing of Suharto’s assets; the 
newsweekly magazine GATRA on August 15, 1998 had a caricature on its cover 
depicting a drowning Suharto in a basket with US$100 bills and the caption in 
big letters Assets of Cendana [i.e. Suharto’s private residence] in Switzerland 
and Austria; THE FAR EASTERN ECONOMIC REVIEW A Monopoly is Forever 
(February 26, 1987); THE SYDNEY MORNING HERALD (April 6, 1998): 
SUHARTO Inc.; Things Fall Apart, THE FAR EASTERN ECONOMIC REVIEW 
(May 13, 1999); and many more publications. 
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the press, and the content and wording of the coverage were within 
the scope of journalistic ethics.  It concluded that the investigative 
report in question did not meet the requirements for it to be 
adjudged an unlawful act.23  The Judicial Review panel, headed by 
Chief Justice Tumpa, indicated that the May 24, 1999, Time issue 
should be seen within the context of the national anti-corruption 
campaign.  The court stated that the media’s depiction of former 
president Suharto as a target of investigation must not be deemed 
an intent to defame.  It was the People’s Consultative Assembly, 
the nation’s highest political authority, which passed a resolution 
mandating the investigation of the former president.24  The Court 
finally ruled that defamation suits should be exclusively filed 
under Civil Code Article 1372.25  That seems to confirm the 
communis opinio doctorum that for tort without deliberateness the 
plaintiff is directed to seek remedies offered by Civil Code Articles 
1365-1371, and that suits against deliberate insults are dealt with 
by Civil Code Articles 1372-1380, with specific reference to 
Criminal Code Articles 310 et seq.  It has led scholars to refer to 
Civil Code Articles 1365-1371 as the lex generalis of tort, and 
Articles 1372-1380 as the lex specialis26 for the specific tort of 
insult. 
The distinction is of special importance for pecuniary and 
procedural purposes.  Under Civil Code Articles 1365-1371, 
plaintiffs may only sue for damages which are quantifiable and 
verifiable.  These must be real, calculated in detail, and supported 
by evidence.  The general tort articles do not support claims for 
immaterial damages unless the tort resulted in a death or 
permanent disability.27   Claims for immaterial damages to restore 
                                                                                                             
23. The Supreme Court’s Judicial Review decision is cited as 
No.273PK/PDT/2008 of April 16, 2009. 
24. PEOPLE’S CONSULTATIVE ASSEMBLY RESOLUTION (Ketetapan, 
sometimes abbreviated as Tap) No. XI/MPR/1998 of November 13, 1998.  
25. This view finds considerable support in the leading texts on private law.  
See C. ASSER, HANDLEIDING TOT DE BEOEFENING VAN HET NEDERLANDS 
BURGERLIJK RECHT, Derde Deel – Verbintenissenrecht, Tweede Stuk: De 
Overeenkomst en de Verbintenis Uit de Wet, bewerkt door Mr. L.E.H. Rutten,  
N.V. Uitgevers-Maatschappij, W.E.J. Tjeenk Willink, Zwolle (1954), at 619.  
26. Jan de Meij, Freedom of the Press and Defamation in the Netherlands, 
unpublished paper submitted at Law Colloquium 2004: From Insult to Slander, 
Defamation and Freedom of the Press, Jakarta, July 28-29, 2004. 
27. INDONESIAN CIV. CODE 1370 and 1371 allow for claims for loss of 
support for the family of the victim of a tort resulting in death, and for claims for 
the loss of livelihood in case the victim is incapacitated for life due to injuries 
sustained as a consequence of the tort.  
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the victim’s good name and reputation must be based on an action 
against insult, and the suit must be based on Civil Code Articles 
1372-1380. 
Another feature of importance in distinguishing the lex 
specialis of the tort of insult from the general tort provisions, the 
lex generalis, is that the former is not self-contained within the 
private law system.  In order to define insult, one has to consult the 
Criminal Code.  Historically, Civil Code Articles 1365-1380 were 
part of the original civil code which was promulgated in 1847.28  
But articles 1372-1380 were substantially amended in 1917 linking 
them closer to the Criminal Code and the Criminal Procedural 
Code.29  The amendments were announced in the State Gazette 
which promulgated the Dutch Criminal Code in the colony.30   Six 
of the 9 articles on defamation have clear links mentioned in the 
articles with the Criminal and Criminal Procedural Codes.31  Only 
two of the general tort articles share this feature.32  Finally, the  
most obvious distinction between the general tort of Civil Code 
Articles 1365-1371 and the special tort articles 1372-1380 is that 
the former insist on the presence of the element of fault, culpa, 
while the latter come into motion upon proof of dolus, 
deliberateness, the animus injuriandi.  
Note that the Court of First Instance, adjudicating the Suharto 
vs. Time suit, found no cause of action in its decision on June 6, 
2000, and that the Court of Appeal affirmed the lower court’s 
judgment on March 16, 2001.  There was a wait of no less than 6 
years before a Supreme Court panel overturned the lower courts’ 
decisions, and awarded a spectacular Rp. 1 trillion damages to the 
plaintiff.  In the meantime, another celebrated case was making its 
way to court. 
                                                                                                             
28. STAATSBLAD (State Gazette) 1847 No. 23. 
29. Reference to the changes are provided (between brackets) in lines before 
the texts of articles 1372, 1373, 1375-1377, and 1380. 
30. STAATSBLAD 1917 No. 497. 
31. Explicit references, at the end of the wording of the article, are called 
schakel bepalingen (linked provisions) to either the criminal code and the 
Criminal Procedural Code are to be found in INDONESIAN CIV. CODE 1372, 
1373, and 1376-1379. 
32. INDONESIAN CIV. CODE 1365 on general tort refers to criminal code 
article 382bis on unfair competition or fraudulence in competition, introduced 
through STAATSBLAD 1920-556, quite possibly in response to the Cohen-
Lindenbaum decision, while INDONESIAN CIV. CODE 1368 (on liability of 
owners of animals for harm done by the animals) stipulates a link to criminal 
code article 490 regarding the control of dangerous animals. 
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Big fires, in traditional bazaars, in Indonesia are almost always 
followed by the construction of modern shopping centers, 
supermarkets, and malls.  The fires are as a rule preceded by failed 
negotiations to persuade existing tenants to move to temporary 
quarters pending the completion of their new, and more expensive 
shops in the newly built premises.  There has always been a 
suspicion, but no proof, that the developers somehow had 
something to do with the fires.  In 2003 a major fire broke out in 
Pasar Tanah Abang, probably one of Southeast Asia’s largest 
garment and textile markets.  Tempo, the leading national 
newsweekly, covered the fire and mentioned the name of a 
developer with close links to the army as a party who was highly 
interested in a new Pasar Tanah Abang project.33  Sensing the 
hidden accusation, and irritated by the use of certain terms in the 
coverage, the developer sued for libel.  The Central Jakarta Court 
of First Instance agreed with plaintiff that the investigative report 
was libelous, and awarded damages in the amount of 
Rp.500.000.000,- (five hundred million rupiah),34 and a penalty of 
Rp.300.000,- (three hundred thousand rupiah) for each day of 
delay in paying the awarded sum.  The court also ordered the 
placement of a public apology in several newspapers with a 
national circulation.35  The defendant appealed, and the High Court 
overruled the lower court’s decision and took over the adjudication 
of the matter.  The court rejected the damages claim for reasons 
that plaintiff had not submitted detailed and convincing 
quantification in arriving at the claimed amount.  The Court also 
ruled that Tempo had correctly balanced out its freedom of 
expression by providing for the citizen’s right of response.36 In 
2005, the Indonesian Supreme Court rejected plaintiff’s appeal and 
affirmed the High Court’s decision.37 
 
IV. DISREGARD OF THE “PUBLIC INTEREST” DEFENSE 
 
In order to be successful with a suit for material and immaterial 
damages under Civil Code Article 1372, a court of law must 
                                                                                                             
33. THE WEEKLY TEMPO (March 3-9, 2003). 
34. Equivalent to US$53,000 at the rate prevailing in June 2010.  
35. Tomy Winata vs Tempo, Decision of the Central Jakarta Court of First 
Instance, No.233/Pdt.G/2003/P.N. Jkt.Pst., on March 18, 2004. 
36. Decision of the Jakarta High Court No.314/PDT/2004/P.T. DKI, dated 
September 3, 2004. 
37. Decision of the Supreme Court No.903K/PDT/2005, dated February 9, 
2006.  
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establish that the defendant’s act meets the requirements set forth 
in Criminal Code Articles 310 et seq.  The act must be: 
(i) deliberate; 
(ii) an assault against the good name and reputation of the 
victim; 
(iii) an accusation of a certain fact; 
(iv) with the clear aim to publicize the fact.  
Pre-independence court decisions had borne out that for the 
printed media the requirements set out above under items (i) and 
(iv) were deemed met by the mere fact of publication.38  Although 
the public interest motive is the only way to escape punishment, 
the concept is underdeveloped due to the scarcity of decisions 
establishing guidelines.  Public interest is known more for what it 
is not, than what it is.  During the colonial era, court reports have 
recorded only one case where defense of public interest was 
successful.39  The matter involved an editor of a daily newspaper 
published in Surabaya, a major harbor city in East Java.  The editor  
allowed two unsigned articles to appear in his paper warning 
readers that a city council member scheduled to be installed was 
facing two customs suits, and should never be admitted to sit on 
the council.  Notwithstanding the warnings the installation was 
carried through.  This prompted the editor to release a harsh article 
criticizing the government department.  The colony’s highest court 
rejected the prosecution’s count of defamation, but affirmed the 
lower court’s finding that the editor afforded the offender, the 
writer whose identity the editor refused to disclose, with the 
opportunity to publish the punishable article.  The public interest 
excuse was admitted, but the editor received a 3-day jail sentence 
for being an accessory to the offence committed by the 
unidentified offender.  In addition for being locked up for 3 days, 
he was charged the costs of the proceedings in both the lower and 
                                                                                                             
38. None of the court decisions cited in this essay raised the issues of 
deliberateness and publicity which are central to a determination whether a 
criminal code article 310 “insult” was indeed committed.  There is solid 
doctrinal support for this position in HAZEWINKEL-SURINGA, INLEIDING TOT DE 
STUDIE VAN HET NEDERLANDSE STRAFRECHT  584 (15 ed., updated by J. 
Remmelink, 1966), and II T.J. NOYON, HET WETBOEK VAN STRAFRECHT 256-
257 (6th ed., updated by G.E. Langemeijer, 1954).  
39. Hooggerechtshof (the highest court in the colony) van Nederlandsch-
Indië, Second Chamber, Decision July 30, 1924 regarding the defamation of a 
public authority or complicity to it, on appeal regarding the defense of having 
acted in the public interest, T.121, at 451. 
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the appeals courts.  Truth and the public interest were not 
considered judicially sufficient reasons to let him walk free. 
 
V. THE HORSE, THE RIDER, AND THE LAW 
 
The term pers delict or “press offence” does not constitute a 
separate class of offences within the Indonesian criminal law 
system.  Most of the offences termed pers delict are general 
offences committed by persons, including journalists, writers, 
editors, and publishers.  Most of the provisions curtailing media 
freedom are to be found in the Criminal Code.40 
Using the pen-name Multatuli,41 Eduard Douwes Dekker, 
wrote Max Havelaar, or The Coffee Auctions of the Dutch Trading 
Company, a novel dealing with plunder, oppression and extortion 
of the Javanese by their feudal masters.  The book, first published 
in 1860, accused the colonial authorities of knowing about the 
mistreatments, and yet choosing to do nothing against it. 
Translated in 34 languages, an English version came out in 1868.  
It was reported that a shiver went through Europe when the book 
appeared.42  The author lost his job in the colonial administration, 
and wrote many letters to friends and editors.  One of those letters 
contained the following famous phrase: “Insulinde43 is a 
magnificent horse.  Its rider is a thief.”44  
One Sunday morning at 09:00 on September 3, 1922, the Indies 
Social Democratic Party convened a congress, at the Oriental 
Movie Theatre, in the West Javanese town of Bandung.  There, on 
                                                                                                             
40. Criminal code articles 61 and 62 on requirements to be met if editors 
and publishers are to be exempted from prosecution;  Criminal code articles 207 
and 208 on insults directed to state authorities (the articles release the judge 
from an optional obligation of granting the right of defendants to prove their 
allegations); criminal code articles 310-328 defining insult, libel, slander, 
deliberateness, and the punishments for committing the offence; criminal code 
articles 155-157, the so-called hatred-sowing articles against statements, 
writings, posters containing expressions of hatred, hostility, and contempt 
against government, or ethnic, religious, and racial groups; criminal code article 
160 prohibiting the advocacy of civil disobedience. 
41. Latin for I have suffered much. 
42. The first English translation from   the   original   manuscript   was done  
by   Baron    Alphonse   Nahuijs,   Edmonton   &   Douglas   (Edinburgh,  1868);   
see a Dutch edited version, available at 
http://cf.hum.uva.nl/dsp/ljc/multatuli/havelaar/index.html (last visited July 10, 
2010).  
43. A poetic name for Indonesia, the largest archipelago in the world. 
44. Letter written to G.J.A. Boulet, April 5, 1876, published in volumes of 
collected writings of the author cited as VW XVIII, at 333. 
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the door handle of the movie house, young party enthusiasts hung a 
white cardboard with precisely that phrase written in big letters.  
The prosecution moved to indict on the basis of Criminal Code 
Article 154, the so-called hate-sowing article.  Article 154 
prohibits people from publicly expressing hatred, hostility, and 
contempt against government, or population groups in the colony.  
The subsequent articles add the requirement of intentional 
publicity, and expand the target audience to population groups 
distinguished by race, religion, ethnicity, descent or nationality.  
The court found the phrase insulting.  It also found the presence of 
elements required under article 154, including the aim to publicize 
or increase exposure in view of the location of the cinema on a 
busy public road by the town square.45  The defendants were fined 
f300, which was convertible to a 2-months jail term if the 
offenders failed to pay up within two months of sentencing.  On 
appeal, the Court of Appeal affirmed the lower court’s judgment.46        
Article 154 of the Criminal Code used to read “. . . whosoever 
arouses or promotes feelings of hostility, hatred or contempt . . .” 
That was indeed how it read in the Dutch Criminal Code.  In 1918, 
at the behest of the then Dutch Minister of Colonies, changes were 
made to the colony’s version of the provision.  It was then made to 
read “. . . whosoever expresses feelings of hostility, hatred, and 
contempt . . .”  The change did away with the requirement of 
evidence of the prohibited arousal and promotion.  The erstwhile 
material offence was turned into a formal offence.  Henceforth, it 
was enough for a person to merely express the forbidden feelings, 
for that person to be sentenced to a jail term up to a maximum of 7 
years.  It was only on July 17, 2007, and 62 years after 
independence, that the Constitutional Court declared Criminal 
Code Articles 154 and 155  in contravention with the human rights 
guarantees in the Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia.47  
Emerging from a different era in the evolution of perceptions 
about government and the state, the Indonesian Criminal Code 
carries provisions which are excessively hostile to the media.  
Articles 207 and 208 stand out as being particularly ill-disposed to 
                                                                                                             
45. Raad van Justitie Batavia, Second Chamber, April 6, 1923, T. 120, at 
496-500. 
46. Hooggerechtshof, Second Chamber, June 6, 1923, T. 120, at 496 and 
500-501. 
47. Constitutional Court Decision No. 6/PUU-V/2007.  The Decision was 
limited to criminal code articles 154 and 155.  The request to find the notorious 
criminal code articles 207 and 208 (insults against public authorities) 
unconstitutional was rejected. 
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freedom of opinion and social critique.  The articles deal with 
insults directed  against government agencies, and dispense with 
the basic principle that only natural persons are capable of feeling 
insulted.  Fictitious persons, like the limited liability, can make 
insulting allegations through members of its board of 
management,48 and can even incur damages caused by defamatory 
remarks at their expense.  However, the cause of action does not lie 
with the special tort of insult, but rather with the general tort 
regime of Civil Code Articles 1365-1371.  With Criminal Code 
Articles 207 and 208, we have a corporate entity called 
government, or its agencies capable of feelings thought to be 
invested exclusively in the human person. 
Early 1938, the colony was feasting.  The Royal House of  
Orange-Nassau was expecting the birth of Princess Beatrix, and  
the daily newspaper Keng Po was at it again.  It published an 
article under the heading of For the Knowledge of the Resident of 
Serang.49   A Resident was the highest Dutch colonial authority in 
the residency, a region which would now be equivalent to either a 
province, or half of it, depending on the area’s economic 
importance to the colonial administration.  The article told the 
story of festivities prepared, by the Bupati,50 of Pandeglang in the 
town square using local bamboo and manpower without paying for 
either.  The poor villagers, already living a subsistence life, were 
sunk deeper into poverty, but nobody dared to protest because the 
order was given by the Bupati himself.  The article ended with the 
sentence: “If that were true . . . why make the people sad when   
jubilation is in order for the House of Orange-Nassau?”51  
Criminal Code Article 207 was used by the prosecution 
because the article does not afford the judge with the prerogative 
of allowing the defendant to prove the truth of his allegation.  The 
use of the article was intimated in private to the scholar who wrote 
the end note to the law report on the decision as de rigueur among 
prosecutors in the colony.52  The court of first instance rejected the 
                                                                                                             
48. As with employer’s liability for tort committed by employees, the 
limited liability company may escape liability for a director’s libelous act if the 
act was committed outside the scope of work for which the director was 
contracted to perform. 
49. The Keng Po (Pandeglang) case, Raad van Justitie Batavia, November 
3, 1938, T. 149, at 67.  
50. The Bupati is the highest ranking authority in the hierarchy of the local 
indigenous bureaucracy. 
51. See supra note 46. 
52. Id. at 74. 
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application of Criminal Code Article 207 for the simple reason that 
the insult was directed to the person of the Bupati, not to the 
Netherlands Indies administration as a body.53  The court ruled that 
Criminal Code Article 310 was the more correct article to apply to 
the matter at hand.  The prosecution was not satisfied and appealed 
to the colony’s highest court.  On November 29, 1938, the colony’s 
Court of Appeal, Second Chamber in Batavia, ruled that the lower 
court had erred in its opinion that the insult was directed to the 
person of the Bupati , and not to the organ of the administration: “. 
. . Wasn’t the aggrieved party called the Regent of Pandeglang?,” 
the court queried.  “. . .  It was indeed directed to a person, to be 
precise.  But it is a person equipped with a public authority!”54  
Article 207 applied.  Seventy years passed.  Insulinde, the 
magnificent horse had become independent.  The colonial rider 
had been chased away.  He didn’t take 207 with him.  The new 
rider likes it.   
In October 2007, a writer by the name of Bersihar Lubis wrote 
a piece for the Tempo Daily criticizing the burning of banned 
books per order of the Attorney General.55  The heading of his 
article was “The Story of the Dumb Interrogator.”  Lubis wrote 
about the interrogation by prosecutors of a certain Joesoef Isak, 
publisher of novels written by the left-leaning author Pramoediya 
Ananta Toer.  Isak recounted to Lubis the reason given him by the 
prosecutor why he was summoned for the interview: 
“Pramoediya’s books have the smell of Marxism . . .”  The 
prosecutor later intimated that he actually carried out the summons 
and interview because his superior wanted him to.  Personally he 
liked Pramoediya’s books.  To this Isak commented to Bersihar 
Lubis that a decision on the basis of a command is dumb.  It was 
the inclusion of this word, dumb, in his article that got Lubis into 
trouble.  The prosecutor’s office in the Depok district reported the 
matter to the police.  Eight months later Bersihar Lubis attended 
his trial at the Depok court of first instance for insulting a 
government agency.  The court found him guilty of libel and 
sentenced him to a jail term of 1 month with a probationary period 
of 3 months, a considerably lighter punishment than the 8 months 
demanded by the prosecution.56  Both parties appealed, and the 
                                                                                                             
53.  Id. at 65-68. 
54. Id. at 69. 
55. KORAN TEMPO, March 17, 2007. 
56. The Bersihar Lubis case Decision, The Depok Court of First Instance, 
February 20, 2008 (unpublished).  
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High Court affirmed the lower court’s decision.57  At the time of 
writing this essay, the case is still on final appeal at the Supreme 
Court.   
Bersihar Lubis and friends challenged the constitutionality of 
the jailing provisions in the criminal code before the Constitutional 
Court, particularly in the face of Indonesia’s constitutional 
provisions protecting the freedom of expression and freedom from 
fear.58 
The request was for a material review of the jailing provisions 
of Criminal Code Articles 310, 311, and 316.  The petitioners also 
requested a review of the constitutionality of Criminal Code 
Article 207 due to its implication of the privileged position granted 
to government agencies before the law, a violation of constitutional 
principle of equality before the law.  In its decision on August 15, 
2008 the Court found each and every petitioned criminal code 
articles in accord with the Constitution upon the following 
reasoning: 
(i) no freedom may be exercised without limitation; 
(ii) freedoms may be limited by considerations of public 
order, moral and public health, national security, rights 
and reputation of others, and limitations based on 
necessity  in a democratic society, on the condition that 
the limitations must be prescribed by law; 
(iii) “The need for separate protection of public officials in 
the exercise of their duty (is warranted) because in their 
function, besides involving the subjective element of 
the individual person of the official, there is also an 
objective element of the institution which requires 
credibility, authority, and capability in order to 
effectively perform their public duties.”59  
(iv) the request relating to the preference of fines over 
incarceration has to do with the judicial application of 
the law, not with its constitutionality.60 
                                                                                                             
57. Mr. Hendrayana of the Press Legal Aid Institute told the author that on 
May 24, 2010 the High Court affirmed the Depok District Court (Court of First 
Instance) decision.   
58. Request for review dated May 7, 2008 listed by the Court Registrar on 
May 12, 2008 under registration Number 14/PUU-VI/2008, corrected on June 3, 
2008. 
59. Constitutional Court Decision Number 14/PUU-VI/2008, August 15, 
2008, at 286. 
60. Id. at 287. 
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The decision contrasts unfavorably with the views of the 
commentator expressed in the End Note to the decision of the 
colonial Hooggerechtshof (Second Chamber) of November 29, 
1938 in the Keng Po (Pandeglang) case.61  Commenting on the 
Court’s support for the use of Criminal Code Article 207 by the 
standing magistrate to catch offences which according to the 
Dutch Criminal Code are not punishable, Professor W.F.C. van 
Hattum declared that such a position contravenes the very system 
of criminal law.  He referred to Criminal Code Article 312 Section 
2 which provides that when a government official is accused of a 
certain fact in the performance of his duties, the law allows the 
accuser to prove that fact.  It violates this system if that right to 
prove the accusation is withheld by prosecuting the accuser 
pursuant to a statute not written for this case.  The law was 
introduced exclusively to cover cases of insult which are not 
punishable according to Dutch law.  The distinction between insult 
to the person and insult to the authority of the person is not only 
difficult to discern, it is also not acceptable if offenders of article 
207 are not guaranteed the right of not being punished if they acted 
in the public interest.  The right to critique is to some extent 
guaranteed under article 312 section 2.  “. . . If this guarantee is 
rendered worthless by simply disqualifying the application of 
article 310, and replacing it by article 207, we would be taking 
another step on the road to the police-state.”62  
 
VI. LEX SPECIALIS, OR “DROIT DE RÉPONSE”? 
 
For over four decades, the Indonesian press suffered closures 
of newspapers and imprisonment of journalists under either 
oppressive dictatorships, or harsh treatment by the law.  The day of 
liberation came, or so it was widely assumed, when a new press 
law was promulgated in 1999.63  The law states that under no 
circumstances will there ever be any closures of newspapers by the 
state.64  Any measure which has the effect of curtailing the 
freedom of the press will be fined.65  Victims of libelous 
publications have the right to respond, and the media publishing 
the libelous allegations have the obligation to fulfil that right.66  
                                                                                                             
61. T. 149, at 71-74.  
62. Id. at 74. 
63. Law No. 40 of 1999 Regarding the Press. 
64. Id. at Article 4, Section (2). 
65. Id. at Article 18, Section (1). 
66. Id. at Article 5, Sections (1) and (2). 
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The law also establishes a Press Council to act as a watchdog of 
ethics of journalism.67  The government, the media, and parliament 
celebrated the law as the lex specialis for all possible offences 
committed by the media.  The Press Law was widely hailed as 
governing all activities of the print media and, therefore, rendering 
inapplicable all other laws relating to the press.  In the ensuing 
debates, it was mentioned that even if no consensus can be reached 
about its lex specialis status the matter can be settled simply by a 
Supreme Court Circular declaring it to be so.68  The courts 
disagree, and rightly so. 
The Press Law of 1999 was never meant to function as a self-
contained and exclusive regime governing the media.  It is by no 
means a collection of primary rules on a specific matter demanding 
priority over secondary rules provided by a lex generalis.  The law 
itself in two instances, one in the body of the text, and another in 
its official elucidation refers to other laws as still applicable.69  A 
cursory examination would also show that the Press Law bears 
some resemblance with the nineteenth century Reglement op de 
Drukwerken,70 a piece of legislation normally referred to in legal 
texts as the droit de réponse.  It provides a right for victims to 
respond to defamatory press coverage.71    
An interesting decision on this matter was issued by the 
Batavia Court of First Instance72 on March 7, 1935.73  The court 
ruled that the droit de réponse of Article 19 of the Reglement op de 
Drukwerken aimed at providing the victim of libelous acts with an 
opportunity to defend himself within the forum of the offender by 
way of a response to reach the same readers.  A complaint filed 
with the court, in the matter of an insult, on the other hand, merely 
aims to enable the state to prosecute a punishable act which, absent 
                                                                                                             
67. Id. at Chapter V, Article 15. 
68. KOMPAS DAILY, July 19, 2004, at 7. 
69. Article 19 of Law No. 40 of 1999 provides that all provisions of law 
bearing on the press which were still in effect at the time the Press Law was 
promulgated will remain so insofar as they do not conflict with, or have not been 
replaced by new laws arising out of the Press Law.  The official elucidation of 
article 12 of the law stipulates that criminal liability is still governed by the 
criminal code. 
70. Regulation on Printed Matter, STAATSBLAD 1856-74, after being 
reduced from 35 to 10 articles. 
71. Id. at article 19. 
72. The court known as Landgerecht was, much like the Raad van Justitie, 
the court of first instance for Europeans during the German occupation of the 
Netherlands. 
73. T. 142 at 773. 
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a complaint would not be possible.  The droit de réponse and the 
filing of a complaint with the court are two causes which may be 
pursued independently from each other.  The filing of a complaint 
with the court in no way bars the plaintiff from making use of his 
right to reply.74  
There may well have been a time when the belief prevailed that 
the Reglement op de Drukwerken was some kind of a special law 
applicable to special offences, sometimes called pers delicten or 
press offences, committed by a special group of people such as 
writers, editors, publishers, and even printers.  The Reglement 
itself was a solid 35-articles piece of legislation when it was issued 
in the mid-nineteenth century.  Looking at the regulation now 
shows that 16 of the 35 articles were withdrawn, while 9 articles 
were repealed with the entry into force of the Criminal Code.  
Punishable offences committed by the printing press, which were 
originally in the Reglement, were taken out and put in the Criminal 
Code.  The measure was probably motivated by the difficulties in 
defining press offences.  To be sure, it represents a certain group of 
offences, but as a law category it is considered too limiting to 
deserve the attribute of a lex specialis.  Offences committed by 
using the print media are only part of a larger category of offences 
involving, among others, public disclosures of thoughts and 
feelings.  Press offences strictly relate to the means of such 
disclosures, not to the punishable offence of the disclosure itself.  
Articles in the Criminal Code prohibiting disclosure of secrets, for 
instance, cannot be categorized as press offences as understood by 
the law.  Neither publicity, nor the public exposure of a thought is 
required under those articles.  The 9 articles removed from the 
Reglement op de Drukpers were not considered press offences 
proper, but were offences of a more general nature which could be 
committed through the print media.   
 
VII. SOLUTIONS, COMPARATIVELY SPEAKING 
 
Most code provisions on defamation are more or less similar in 
civil code countries in Asia, be they Germanic or French in origin.  
In South Korea, both the Constitutional Court and the Supreme 
Court have chosen the creatively path-breaking route to respond to 
the changing times.  On June 24, 1999 the Korean Constitutional 
Court pronounced that the standard of scrutiny in the 
criminalization of libel should be more strictly applied when the 
                                                                                                             
74. Id. 
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victim is a private person rather than a public figure, and the matter 
alleged is of private rather than of public concern.75  Matters of 
public concern, thus the Court, have to do with the public right to 
know, in order for the public to responsibly participate in political 
decision-making in a democracy.  The Court underscored the 
chilling effect of criminal libel law on freedom of the press: 
If the requirement of libel defenses (truth and only for 
public interest) under the Criminal Code are too narrowly 
applied, the scope of criminal sanctions will expand and 
press freedom will shrink.  If criminal punishment is used 
to preclude criticism and debates about matters of public 
concern, freedom of the press will be suffocated and the 
balancing scale will be tipped too far towards reputational 
protection.76 
In both Korea and Japan, “truth and the public interest” are 
formidable defenses against Criminal Code punishment.  In a 
decision dated February 27, 2004 the Korean Supreme Court held 
that a defendant is not liable if there is proof of the truth of his 
allegation, or the belief that the accusation is true notwithstanding 
the absence of evidence.77  This applies even if there is only a 
reasonable ground to believe that the defamatory allegations are 
true.  The burden of proof, however, remains with the media. 
Similarly, the Japanese Supreme Court held in a case decided 
as early as June 25, 1969 that the defendant needs only to prove 
that the statement was made under the mistaken but reasonable 
belief, based on reliable materials and a reliable source, that it was 
true.78  Statements made in good faith are not actionable because 
they do not indicate a criminal intent on the part of the publisher. 
The Japanese also made a couple of conceptual refinements.  
The ‘truth’ defense concept, for instance, applied only in cases 
where defamation was inflicted on public figures.  The private 
                                                                                                             
75. Cited as “Constitutional Court, 97 Honma 265, June 24, 1999,” in Kyu 
Ho-youm, Press Freedom and Defamation in South Korea, , unpublished paper 
submitted at Law Colloquium 2004: From Insult to Slander, Defamation and 
Freedom of the Press, Jakarta, July 28-29, 2004, at 26. 
76. Id. at 27-28. 
77. Id. cited as “Supreme Court 2001, Ta 53387, February 27, 2004”, at 25. 
78. The Yukan Wakayama Jiji case, cited as “23 Keishu 975, Supreme 
Court, June 25, 1969” in Masao Horibe, A Draft on Defamation and Freedom of 
the Press in Japan, unpublished paper submitted at Law Colloquium 2004: 
From Insult to Slander, Defamation and Freedom of the Press, Jakarta, July 28-
29, 2004, at 25. 
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person-public figure dichotomy was removed from its black-and-
white realm.  In 1981 the Japanese Supreme Court held that even 
the private behavior of a private person could be of public concern 
depending on the nature of the person’s social activities and the 
extent of his influence in society.79  The decision concerned 
improprieties carried out by a Daisaku Ikeda, honorary chairman 
of a Buddhist lay organization, towards two women members of 
the organization.   
Japan’s doctrine of popular sovereignty, a prominent principle 
in the nation’s constitution, provides the rationale for the reduced 
protection of public officials against allegations thrown at their feet 
because they are “servants of the whole community” and, 
therefore, subjected to the people’s will to hire or fire.80  The 
doctrine is of particular interest because most national constitutions 
carry the same principle, but very few gave it the legal 
interpretation as far-reaching as Japan’s. 
The Indonesian judiciary is timid, cautiously conformist, more 
conventional, and less progressive compared to their East Asian 
counterparts.  They prefer not to lead.  In this regard, the 
Constitutional Court is more consistently so, while the Supreme 
Court occasionally issues a serendipitous decision or two.  The 
latter’s decision on the Suharto vs. Time review matter81 was both 
painful, since the Court had to censure its own decision,82 and 
clear-sighted.  It annulled the Supreme Court decision of August 
30, 2007, viewed Time’s coverage within the context of national 
campaigns against corruption, saw no intention of Time to defame 
Suharto mainly because the People’s Consultative Assembly in its 
resolution had mandated the investigation of Suharto’s assets.  A 
major issue it cleared up was that suits for damages due to insults 
must be exclusively conducted pursuant to Civil Code Article 
1372. 
Compared to the image of valiant resolve emerging from the 
Time review decision, the outcome of one of the many Tempo 
matters came across as listless.  In March 2003, in the wake of the 
Tempo coverage of the big fire at Pasar Tanah Abang, the office of 
the weekly news magazine was visited by a group of angry people.  
The editors of the magazine felt themselves threatened and 
                                                                                                             
79. Id. at 24-25, the Gekkan Pen. Case, cited as “1000 Hanrei Jiho 25, 
Supreme Court, April 16, 1981.” 
80. Id. at 26. 
81. Supra note 23. 
82. Supra notes 18, 15, and 16. 
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reported the matter to the police.  Coming out from the police 
station, a senior editor explained to the media who were gathered 
outside that Tempo demanded the attack to be fully investigated, 
lest the country would fall into the hands of gangsters.  The 
businessman whose employees paid the visit to Tempo’s offices 
felt insulted and filed a suit under Civil Code Article 1372 against 
the senior editor, the daily newspaper Koran Tempo which 
reported the senior editor’s statement, and the company publishing 
the newspaper.83  The damages demanded ran up to Rp. 1 billion 
for actual damage incurred, and Rp. 20 billion for restoring good 
name and reputation.84  Additionally, plaintiff demanded that 
defendants issued public apologies in 4 daily newspapers, 
including the defendants’ newspaper, the attachment for security 
purposes of the residence of the senior editor and the newspaper’s 
office spaces, and a daily late performance penalty of Rp.10 
million.  The court of first instance found the defendants guilty of 
the tort of insult, rejected the plaintiff’s damages claims because of 
insufficient precision in itemizing, calculating the amount 
demanded.  The court lifted the attachment of the senior editor’s 
residence, but ordered the defendants to issue the public apologies 
with the claimed daily late performance penalty.85  The Jakarta 
Court of Appeal upheld the lower court’s decision, but the senior 
editor lodged an appeal to the Supreme Court.  The Court rejected 
the appeal,86 and Chief Justice Harifin Tumpa suggested that the 
editor offer his apologies to the plaintiff.87  The Supreme Court 
decision vacated the Rp.1 billion fine, and reduced the daily Rp.1 
million penalty for performance delays.  Lawyers for the 
defendants were quick in their response that a Judicial Review will 
be lodged with the Supreme Court.  Harifin Tumpa, Chief Justice 
                                                                                                             
83. Tomy Winata vs Gunawan Mohamad (the senior editor), KORAN TEMPO 
(the daily newspaper), and P.T. Tempo Inti Media Harian (the publisher of the 
daily newspaper). 
84. The Rp.:US$ exchange rate in 2003 was between Rp.8897,20 (January) 
and Rp.8487,75 (December) according to x-rates.com, available at 
http://www.x-rates.com/d/IDR/USD/hist2003.html (last visited July 10, 2010). 
85. Decision of the East Jakarta Court of First Instance 
No.180/PDT.G/2003/PN.JKT.TIM (unpublished). 
86. No reports were available of either the High Court decision, or the 
Supreme Court rejection of the appeal.  The information about the appeal and 
rejection of the appeal was published in VIVA NEWS of August 13-14, 2009, 
available at http://nasional.vivanews.com/news/read/82892-
ma_tak_gunakan_uu_pers; and http://nasional.vivanews.com/news/read/82694-
goenawan_mohamad_ajukan_peninjauan_ (last visited July 10, 2010). 
87. Id. 
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of the Supreme Court, was asked why he chose not to reprimand 
the lower courts for not consulting the Press Council in arriving at 
their decisions,88 as he recommended in a recent instruction.  
Justice Tumpa answered that no instructions were issued, only an 
appeal.  Judges should not be told what law to apply as that would 
violate judicial independence, he said.  When asked what was to be 
done when lower courts refused to comply with the appeal, he 
referred to the institution of the judicial review as a last resort.89  It 
never came to that.  The last news heard about the case was that 
plaintiff and defendants got together on October 6, 2009, had 
dinner, and made peace.90 
 
VIII. SOMETHING HAPPENED ON THE WAY TO FREEDOM 
 
A focus on the work of the Constitutional Court produces glum 
perspectives not only because of its authoritarian proclivities 
evident in their decisions regarding the Blasphemy Law,91 the 
Pornography Law,92 and maintenance of the Film Censor Board.93 
Reading through the detailed and timely produced reports of 
decisions it was not easy to suppress a sense of déjà vu.  The tone 
in these decisions was paternalistic, gentle but steely, and 
convincingly set on a course of rolling back liberties perceived as 
having gone too far.  The court meticulously maintained a clinical 
separation between the law on the books and its interpretation and 
enforcement by the police, the prosecution and the courts.  
Indonesia’s Constitutional Court perceives its mandate to be 
limited to the constitutional review of positive law.  The decisions 
impart the impression that no consideration was admitted of the 
general context within which the protected laws have been, and 
continue to be interpreted and enforced.  That general context 
                                                                                                             
88. On December 30, 2008, Chief Justice Harifin Tumpa issued Supreme 
Court Circular Letter No. 14 to all courts in Indonesia in which he recommended 
the judiciary to consult the Press Council on whether certain acts were or were 
not defamatory, and seek to mediate the conflict in accord with the provisions of 
the Press Law. 
89. VIVA NEWS, August 14, 2009. 
90. TEMPO INTERACTIVE, October 7, 2009, available at 
http://www.tempointeractive.com/hg/nasional/2009/10/07/brk,20091007-
201319,uk.html (last visited July 10, 2010). 
91. Constitutional Court Decision Number 140/PUU-VII/2009, April 12, 
2010. 
92. Constitutional Court Decision Number 10-17-23/PUU-VII/2009, March 
25, 2010. 
93. Constitutional Court Decision Number 29/PUU-V/2007, April 30, 2008. 
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discloses a field of abuses of power, arbitrary and selective 
enforcement of the law, and miscarriages of justice within a 
general atmosphere of corruption, collusion, and nepotism. 
On the Corruption Perception Index list compiled by 
Transparency International for 2009, Indonesia occupies the 111th 
position on a list of 180 countries.  The country shares the spot 
with Algeria, Djibouti, Egypt, Kiribati, Mali, Solomon Islands, and 
Togo.  The recent exposures of widespread case brokerage 
activities involving the judiciary, the prosecution, and the police, 
have singled out the latter as the most corrupt institution in the 
country.  Its latest exploit consisted of jailing a whistle-blowing 
police general, and the fabrication of indictments against two 
deputy heads of the Corruption Eradication Commission.94  Two 
prosecutors and a judge were indicted for brokering a tax evasion 
case involving US$1.6 million.  The judge confessed to having 
received bribes to the amount of US$ 5,000.95  The head 
prosecutor at the Attorney General’s office investigating a big 
corruption matter was caught red-handed receiving a bribe of 
US$660,000.96  To add spice to the context, on and around 
November 5, 2009, Chief Justice Mohamad Mahfud Md. of the 
Constitutional Court, ordered the Corruption Eradication 
Commission to deliver tapes to the Court the contents, of which 
had been circulating through mobile phones and computers.  The 
4.5-hour tapes, recording conversations between prosecutors, the 
police and a judge, were played in a court and exposed a 
conspiracy involving the law enforcement institutions and the 
person accused of siphoning off cash from a failed bank which was 
being bailed out with government money.  The conspirators 
fabricated a bribery case against two deputy heads of the 
Corruption Eradication Commission.  Coming out of the court 
room, Chief Justice Mahfud was interviewed and caught on TV 
saying how sad it was for him to witness law enforcers being 
controlled like animals by financiers.  In retaliation against the 
playing of the tape, and saying unkind words about the police, the 
entire police contingent on personal guard duty to the Chief Justice 
and his family was withdrawn the next day.   
                                                                                                             
94. THE JAKARTA GLOBE, October 5, 2009; THE JAKARTA POST, June 14, 
2010. 
95. THE JAKARTA POST, April 21, 2010; THE JAKARTA GLOBE WEBSITE, 
April 14, 2010. 
96. Nurlis E. Meuko, Misteri Aliran Dana Joko Versi Bibit, VIVA NEWS, 
October 1, 2009, available at http://korupsi.vivanews.com/news/read/93712-
misteri_aliran_dana_djoko_versi_bibit (last visited July 10, 2010). 
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The nine justices of the Constitutional Court do not work in a 
vacuum.  The very same context is a continuing source of concern, 
worry, and fear for the ordinary citizen at the other end of 
enforcement.  It is this fear that they brought to the Court when 
they asked for protection from the harshness, uncertainties, and 
abuses of colonial laws which are frequently interpreted and 
applied by less than caring police and the standing magistrature.  
Almost without exception, they have been turned away empty-
handed.  To wit, they have asked whether jailing journalists was 
not too excessive considering that they already have to suffer the 
obligation to abide by the victim’s right of response, the hefty 
damages awards under Civil Code Article 1372, and the fines 
mentioned in Criminal Code Articles 310 et seq.  Perhaps the 
jailing provisions could be found to be violating the freedom from 
fear protected by the constitution?  The Court would have none of 
it.97  They asked the Court whether it was possible at all to stick to 
the principle of equality before the law, and do away with the 
colonial lèse majesté clauses and have the law treat insults directed 
to the president and vice president the same way as insults aimed at 
the citizen.  The Court seemed a bit moved, and bent over 
backwards to split the president and vice president in two.  One 
part is to be the person of the president.  If the person feels 
insulted, that part can resort to Criminal Code Article 310 et seq 
like everybody else.  The presidential part of the person, however, 
is directed to Criminal Code Article 207, a no less colonial piece of 
legislation than the abrogated lèse majesté articles.98  The decision 
assumes that a presidency is susceptible to feelings of being 
insulted.99  None of the petitions, however, mentioned that the 
article violates the criminal law system.  Nor did anybody raise the 
matter of a step-wise walk in the direction of the police state which 
concerned the writer of the end-note to the Keng Po (Pandeglang) 
case in 1938.100   
                                                                                                             
97. Decision of the Constitutional Court Number 14/PUU-VI/2008, August 
15, 2008. 
98. These would be Criminal Code Articles 134, 136bis, and 137.  See infra 
page 20-21 for a scholarly comment on the popularity of criminal code article 
207 by colonial prosecutors. 
99. But see, the Keng Po (Pandeglang) case, at infra pages 18 and 19 ; one 
of the leading texts in Criminal Law insists that insult can only be inflicted 
against a natural or biological person, a principle faithfully maintained in all 
articles in the entire title XVI by consistently using the word “somebody” to 
designate the victim of the insult and, as a consequence thereof, by using the 
term “the deceased” in criminal code article 320 and 321.     
100. T.149 at 74.  
2010]                   PRESS FREEDOM IN INDONESIA               159 
 
The dissenting opinion to the decision offered some interesting 
observations.  It saw the president as distillation of the Indonesian 
people so that the president is actually a personal manifestation of, 
and represents the dignity and grandeur of the people (the personal 
embodiment and representative of people dignity and majesty).   
The opinion wanted more splits in the president, and produced 
the president as a Head of State, a Head of Government, a 
Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces, and a Chief Diplomat, 
all these functions are stipulated in the constitution, the implication 
being that each part of a president may have different feelings of 
being insulted.  The dissent also quoted dicta allegedly cultivated 
by the U.S. Supreme Court which the dissenting judge interpreted 
as a refutation of the principle of equality before the law: The 
principle of equality does not mean that every law must have 
universal application for all who are not by nature, attainment or 
circumstances in the same position, as the varying needs of 
different classes of persons often require separate treatment.101 
No citation was given for the U.S. Supreme Court quotation.  It 
could either be taken out of context, or refer to differentiation 
rather than discrimination.  To allow maternity leave to women 
and not to men is a recognition of difference, not a discrimination.  
A legal system granting a right to some but not to others is 
discriminative, as would be a law the breach of which is 
punishable to the man-in-the-street, but not to journalists.  
Granting the right to a public interest defense against accusations 
of libel when the victim is a private individual, but withholding it 
when the target of the insult is a government official is 
discrimination.   
To some, the description of a president, as the “distillation of 
the people” conjures images of a dictatorship.102  The last time 
Indonesia had a president called the voice of the people, the show 
ended up in the most horrendous bloodbath the nation has known 
in its modern history.103  The lèse majesté articles in the Indonesian 
                                                                                                             
101. Decision of the Constitutional Court Number 013-022/PUU-IV/2006, 
at 74. 
102. It also brings back recollections about the phrase “All animals are 
equal, but some animals are more equal than others” in GEORGE ORWELL, 
ANIMAL FARM (1945). 
103. On September 30, 1965 a heavily armed contingent of the palace guard 
murdered almost the entire general staff of the army.  The support of the 
Indonesian Communist Party, the largest party outside the Sino-Soviet bloc, was 
thought to be evident from editorials in the People’s Daily, the party’s agitprop 
organ, and the almost immediate nationwide formation of Revolutionary 
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Criminal Code were repealed in form, but promptly replaced in 
essence.  Criminal Code Articles 134, 136bis and 137 were 
declared unconstitutional and devoid of force and effect.  The 
Constitutional Court replaced them with Criminal Code Articles 
310 et seq and 207.  The opinion of the slim majority of the 
justices of the Court that there is no place in a democratic republic 
with popular sovereignty for articles which contradict the principle 
of equality before the law was not reflected in the decision. 
Criminal Code Articles 154 et seq prohibit expressions of 
hostility, hatred, and contempt towards the government of 
Indonesia, hence the name hate-sowing articles.  The petition to 
declare the articles unconstitutional included the request to review 
article 107 on rebellion, articles 160 and 161 on instigations to 
disobey government measures, and articles 207-208 on insulting 
government agencies.  Legal standing of petitioners were 
recognized only in the case of the hate-sowing articles.  The court 
found the petitioners wanting of legal standing for the remaining 
articles.  The decision was passed by a thin majority of five to four.   
The hate-sowing articles were to be scrapped because they are 
formal offences, because they lend themselves to arbitrary 
interpretation by the authorities, and because critique tended to be 
easily qualified as an expression of hostility, hatred and contempt.  
The decision pointed out that the Dutch Minister of Justice himself 
stated that the hate-sowing provisions were meant to apply to 
colonial communities, and definitely not fit to be taken over by the 
realm in Europe.  It is interesting to note that the majority thought 
the articles irrational because it is just not possible that citizens of 
an independent and sovereign country could be hostile towards 
their own state and government.  Nevertheless, the Court hailed the 
government’s testimony which stated that the same provisions 
have been maintained in the new draft criminal code, this time as 
material offences.104 
 
                                                                                                             
Councils.  Within weeks the Party’s organization was paralyzed by massive 
uprisings of non-communist political forces under the protection of army 
elements.  The resulting witch-hunt and massacres claimed the lives of people 
estimated at between 60,000 to 200,000 men and women. 
104. Constitutional Court Decision Number 6/PUU-V/2007, at 77-79. 
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IX. A CLAUSE TO OVERTURN ALL CLAUSES 
 
After its second amendment, the Constitution of Indonesia105 
was said to contain a world-standard Bill of Rights.106  Chapter XA 
on Human Rights contains 10 human rights clauses.  It reads as if 
the entire contents of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights had 
been condensed into one chapter and bravely inserted in the 
Constitution.  The way the clauses have been and continue to be 
interpreted by the judiciary, however, have been a source of 
serious concern to Indonesian as well as international rights 
organizations.  A recurrent theme in rejecting applications for 
judicial review of oppressive criminal code provisions is the 
didactically prescriptive balancing of rights and obligations, and 
the consequent limitation of human rights.  It is considered the 
state’s duty to protect persons whose rights are violated by the 
exercise of the freedoms of other persons.  The nine human rights 
articles in the Indonesian Constitution seem to be at the mercy of 
Article 28J at the end of the list which allows their limitation by 
statutory enactment.107  Of tremendous support to the potential 
roll-back of rights provided by this clause is the similar clause in 
Article 19 Paragraph 3 of the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights (“ICCPR”).108  Considerable support for 
maintaining the oppressive anti-defamation laws is derived from 
                                                                                                             
105. Resolved at the Session of the People’s Consultative Assembly 
(“M.P.R.”) on August 18, 2000. 
106. Simon Butt & Firmansyah Arifin, Corruption and the Judiciary in 
Indonesia, in POLICY BRIEFS 2 (2008), available at: 
http://www.aigrp.anu.edu.au/publications/briefs.php  (last visited July 10, 2010). 
107. Indonesian Constitution, Chapter XA, Article 28J, Section (2):  
In exercising his rights and freedoms, every person is obliged to submit 
to limitations stipulated by law aimed exclusively to guarantee the 
recognition of- and respect for the freedom rights of other persons and 
for the satisfaction of just demands in accordance with moral, religious 
values, security, and public order considerations in a democratic 
society. 
108. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Article 19, 
Paragraph 3: 
The exercise of the rights provided for in paragraph 2 of this article 
carries with it special duties and responsibilities.  It may therefore be 
subject to certain restrictions, but these shall only be such as are 
provided by law and are necessary:  
a. For respect for the rights and reputations of others; 
b. For the protection of national security or of public order (ordre 
public), or of public health or morals. 
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the translation of the term slander into the Indonesian language by 
the word fitnah, a word of Arabic origin defined by the Qur’an as 
an act more heinous than murder.109  The severity of punishment 
for defamation in the secular codes thereby obtains solid 
endorsement and legitimacy in religious doctrine.  In independent 
Indonesia, Fitnah and sedition are widely felt to be deserving of 
more severe punishment, larger damage awards, bigger fines, and 
longer jail sentences than was ever meted out by colonial 
judiciaries.   
It is not true that the Indonesian political elite has mobilized a 
broad move to roll back freedoms which were already granted.  
Restrictions on freedoms have always been present either by 
products of colonial legislation, or by laws passed by rubber-stamp 
parliaments under dictatorships during some 40 years, as well as 
laws made in the everlasting so-called transition period towards 
full democracy.110  It is this law-making aspect of the past, which 
Harold J. Berman referred to as the law-based state, known in 
Indonesia as the Rechtsstaat, or the system of Rule-by-Law, to 
distinguish it from a system of Rule-of-Law.111  The unintended 
implication of this distinction is that freedoms are more rooted in 
the rule of law state, and that these are mostly found in common 
law countries.  The identifications, however, do not fit reality.  The 
                                                                                                             
109. THE HOLY QUR’AN, Surah 2, Al-Baqarah, verses 191 and 217. 
110. President Sukarno dissolved the Indonesian Constituent Assembly, 
seizes power on July 5, 1959, and established the national-democratic stage of 
his revolution.  On March 11, 1966 it was Suharto’s turn to wrest away power 
from President Sukarno, and sets up a military dictatorship that lasted until 
1998;  
111. Harold J. Berman, The Rule of Law and the Law-Based State 
(Rechtsstaat), With Special Reference to the Soviet Union, in TOWARD THE 
“RULE OF LAW” IN RUSSIA? POLITICAL AND LEGAL REFORM IN THE TRANSITION 
PERIOD especially  n. 11 (Donald D. Barry ed. 1992).   Jeffrey Kahn explains the 
Rule–by-Law as a consequence of the doctrine of representative democracy with 
parliament being the exclusive actualizers of sovereignty of the people.  Laws 
made by elected representatives of those who hold the exclusive sovereignty of 
the nation hold the supreme authority in the state.  The legislature being an arm 
of the state holds monopoly power over the making of laws.  The executive state 
enforces, while the judiciary implements.  The concept is clinically neutral from 
value judgments on the exercise of power by the state.  Hence, Nazi Germany 
was a Rechtsstaat, as was Stalin’s Soviet Union.  “There is no substantive 
prescription beyond the positivist procedural requirements of rule by laws.” See 
JEFFREY KAHN, FEDERALISM, DEMOCRATIZATION, AND THE RULE OF LAW IN 
RUSSIA 54 (2002).  The Rule of Law, on the other hand, is the system which 
does not accept the state as the exclusive fountainhead of law.  In common law 
states the depoliticized courts have acted as a major source of law and what 
Kahn called other normative standards. 
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countries in Western Europe are rechtsstaat countries, yet their 
states are not only subject to state-made laws, but to judge-made 
laws, international law and tribunals as well.  Closer to Indonesia, 
Malaysia and Singapore, both wedded to the common law system, 
generate many complaints about “the blatant use of the criminal 
law as a political instrument . . . harsh laws which censor public 
opinion. . .” and then again “. . . established practice of Singapore 
which routinely uses defamation and contempt charges against 
foreign journalists and opposition politicians.”112  Much like 
Indonesia, the legal infrastructure to restrict liberties already exists 
in both Singapore and Malaysia.  It is the heritage of colonial times 
to which is added a newly set of enacted statutes after 
independence to lend a local flavor to “foreign” legislation.113  
In Indonesia, the inundation of the Constitutional Court with 
petitions demanding the review of laws deemed obstructing the 
free flow of information, opinions and critique stems from a 
complex mental perspective.  There is the thought ingrained in the 
back of the professional mind by decades of experience at the 
hands of dictatorship that the only threat to freedom of the press is 
the closure of publications.  Such was indeed the single deadly 
measure the military regime unleashed unto critical media.  The 
euphoria which accompanied the passing of the Press Law 114 by a 
parliament liberated by the fall of a dictator,115 brought the wrong 
impression that the law will take care of all existing and potential 
dangers confronting journalists and the media.  Finally there was 
the mixture of indignation, surprise, and panic at being faced by a 
plethora of lawsuits filed by plaintiffs, some of whom would not 
normally command the respect of the community, yet managed to 
persuade the judiciary to mete out stiff sentences and large awards.  
It was this complex of feelings, thoughts, and circumstances which 
moved petitioners to demand constitutional reviews of laws 
                                                                                                             
112. Kanishka Jayasurya, The Rule of Law and Regimes of Exception in 
East Asia, Working Paper No. 96, Asia Research Center, Murdoch University, 
July 2000, at 3. 
113. For a treatment on the subject during the military dictatorship in 
Indonesia, see Daniel S. Lev, Colonial Law and the Genesis of the Indonesian 
State, 40 INDONESIA (Oct. 1985).  Referring to the take-over of oppressive 
colonial legislation by an independent Indonesia, Lev wrote: “It is not simply 
that such legal provisions have been retained, but that their retention implies the 
same understanding of political prerogative from which they originated,” id. at 
73. 
114. Law No.40 of 1999. 
115. General Suharto was deposed in the wake of the monetary crisis of 
1998. 
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deemed hostile to press freedom.  The Constitutional Court 
rejected most of the demands, and acceded to some because other 
laws, no less hostile, are or will be substituted for the statutes to be 
repealed.   
Human Rights Watch issued a most recent report on the state 
of freedom of expression in Indonesia.116 It is a scathing 
indictment against an excessively oppressive criminal defamation 
law regime, and a willing law enforcement apparatus to pursue the 
accuser rather than investigate the offence the plaintiff is accused 
of.  The report complains that in the hands of financially and 
politically powerful personalities, criminal anti-defamation laws 
become destructive implements against critique and opposition.  
These laws are more susceptible to abuse and manipulation, 
particularly when employed by government officials with 
investigative authority backed by financially strong parties.  The 
Information & Electronic Transaction Law117 was singled out as 
particularly hostile with its threat of imprisonment of up to 6 years, 
a fine of up to Rp. 1 billion, and a possible pretrial detention.118 
The bad conditions of freedom of the press in Indonesia seems 
to be somewhat shared by its neighbors.  Despite its bad report 
card, Indonesia is deemed to have the freest press in Southeast 
Asia by Reporters Without Borders.  On its worldwide press 
freedom index for 2009, Indonesia was given a score of 28.50, 
over and above its neighbors.  Eritrea stood at the bottom of the list 
with a score of 115.5.  Scandinavian countries and Ireland were on 
top of the list and rated 0 (zero).  It must have been a satisfying 
sight for the Indonesian government to watch Indonesia leading its 
neighbors in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations in press 
freedom.119  
 
                                                                                                             
116. See, Turning Critics into Criminals, The Human Rights Consequences 
of Criminal Defamation in Indonesia, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, May 3, 2010, 
available at: http://www.hrw.org/en/reports/2010/05/04/turning-critics-criminals 
(last visited July 10, 2010). 
117. Law No.11/2008 on Information & Electronic Transaction. 
118. A petition for constitutional review of two articles in the law submitted 
by citizens was squarely rejected by the Constitutional Court in its decision 
Number 50/puu-VI/2008, on May 5, 2009. 
119. On the Reporters without Borders World Press Freedom Index for 
2009, Indonesia scored 28.50, above the Philippines (38.25), Thailand (44), 
Malaysia (44.25), and Singapore (45).  See, Press Freedom Index 2009, 
available at  http://en.rsf.org/press-freedom-index-2009,1001.html 
(last visited July 10, 2010). 
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X. TO CONCLUDE 
 
The road to freedom meets a dead-end at Constitution junction.  
The Indonesian Constitutional Court is not ready to lead the nation 
on the way to reform.  The Court is resolved to maintain laws on 
the books which were promulgated for the security and ease of law 
enforcement in a colony.  The Court also held on to statutes which 
were enacted after independence by authoritarian regimes and 
compliant parliaments.  The only way out is to muddle through the 
conventional judicial process and cope with its capricious 
outcomes.  That is not an easy task.  There is no discernible 
method in the way courts arrive at their decisions.  This makes it 
very difficult to navigate a way through the hazards planted in the 
colonial civil and criminal codes, and the considerably more 
hostile post-independence statutes.  The use of such “insulting” 
words as dumb,120 or thief,121 or scavenger,122 or Suharto Inc.123 is 
punished, but so are complaints against allegedly fraudulent 
sellers.124  A patient sending an e-mail to friends complaining of 
maltreatment in a hospital,125 editors warning authorities not to 
install an official who was still facing customs suits, and 
consumers complaining about bad service through letters to the 
editor are brought to trial.  The Press Law of 1999 is not an 
adequate bar against criminal prosecution or tort suits.126  An issue 
of grave concern is that serious critique, and by any standard 
necessary,127 directed against public authority, even if public 
                                                                                                             
120. The Bersihar Lubis case. See supra notes 56 and 57. 
121. The Indies Social Democratic Party Congress case in Bandung, Raad 
van Justitie Batavia, Second Chamber, April 6, 1923, T.120 at 496-500. 
122. The Tomy Winata v Tempo case, Central Jakarta Court of First 
Instance, Decision No.233/Pdt.G/2003/P.N.Jkt.Pst, March 18, 2004. 
123. The Suharto v Time Magazine case, Supreme Court Decision No.3215 
K/PDT/200, August 30, 2007. 
124. The North Jakarta Court of First Instance Decision Number 
178/PDT/G/2007/PN.JKT.UT, in the Seng Seng case on May 6, 2008. 
125. The celebrated case of Prita-of-the-Coins (nationwide contributions of 
coins in support for the defense of Prita Mulyasari, a pregnant mother of two 
being the first victim of pretrial detention under the Information & Electronic 
Transaction Law); her criminal prosecution was dismissed by the Tangerang 
Court of First Instance (Decision Number 1269/Pid.B/2009/PN.TNG), but the 
prosecution appealed to the Supreme Court, while the hospital’s civil suit 
against her awarded the plaintiff damages in the sum of Rp.204.000.000, an 
amount she could not afford.  
126. See supra notes 70-71. 
127. See supra note 46.  
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interest is judicially recognized remains punishable.128  On the 
other hand, as if to increase the level of general uncertainty, 
defendants who failed proving the truth of their allegedly libelous 
accusations are pardoned.129  It seems as if a message is forcefully 
imposed on the general public that complaints about bad treatment 
or fraud by sellers of goods or services must be kept a secret 
between the complainer and the complainee, or between the victim 
and the police.  Complaints must not be put in letters to the editor, 
nor in e-mails if the latter is accessible by others.  No bad words, 
no critique, and no complaints.     
All of these decisions were reached by courts by having the 
facts meet with the law.  This is how the law is interpreted, 
applied, and enforced.  This IS the law.  There is no way in which 
the law on the books can be clinically divorced from the way it is 
operated in practice.  Statements by justices at the Constitutional 
Court that laws in operation are none of the Court’s business, 
implying that the Court’s exclusive mandate is to mathematically 
project a statute against provisions in the constitution.  This 
understanding is excessively legistic and lack support in the dicta, 
holdings, and rulings in their own decisions.   
The wait now is for more widespread publicity of decisions and 
transparency in the process of decision-making.  A more brief and 
simplified version of law reports rather than the unnecessarily long 
and repetitive texts of decisions should persuade commentators to 
dwell more on the reasoning rather than the end result of court 
decisions.  Open discussions and the emergence of recognizable 
doctrinal consensus in the civil and criminal law system of 
Indonesia, acknowledged sources of law, should persuade the 
judiciary to look beyond the black letter of the law in their search 
for justice.  For justice is also to be found among the practitioners, 
enforcers, and those who receive its painful assaults.  Nobody said 
that change was going to be easy for a system that survived 
centuries of feudal rule, colonial administration, and four decades 
of post-independence dictatorships.  
                                                                                                             
128. See supra note 36. 
129. Time Inc. failed to prove allegations regarding Suharto’s shifting of 
huge amounts of money between bank accounts in Switzerland and Austria.  
Tempo was not able to prove that plaintiff Winata took an interest in the 
rebuilding of one of the largest garment and textile markets in Asia.  See supra 
note 23, and notes 36 and 37. 
